Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice Book

Since Derek Parfit published his REASONS & PERSONS in 1985, there has been renewed interest in philosophical psychology about the status of intellectual thought-experiments: what would we say if...? Directly countering Parfit's view that our moral life must be tailored to our speculation about the mind, Haksar argues in this book that presuppositions of our moral and practical life should have a bearing on what we believe about persons and personal identity. Haksar strongly defends the indivisible self view, using a detailed examination of the empirical evidence arising from plit-brain and multiple personality cases. He outlines the moral, social, legal and practical implications of the different views of the self (and of the no-self view) and deals extensively with suffering, individual persons, and groups. Up-to-date and informed, the book integrates two controversial areas of philosophy-moral philosophy and philosophy of the mind.Read More